THE following work has grown out of my necessities and my experience as a teacher. When, several years ago, I accepted a professorship, the duties of which required me to teach Logic, I could nowhere find a text-book that seemed to me to satisfy the demands of the science. Nor was this feeling peculiar to myself. Arguments that commend themselves to any untaught mind as valid and practically important, have no place in a system that professedly includes all reasoning whatever; and an attempt to reduce to its technical forms the first few pages of any scientific work, has generally ended in failure and disgust.
Gavin discusses his belief that the security of the United States no longer depends on weapons, armed forces, and holding areas of strategic value around the globe, but rather on less tangible factors such as the people's standard of living and the overall economic health of the nation.
Military Security Blankets And this, he says, is doubly tragic, because: The manned atomic bomber, declares Paratrooper Gavin, will be out of business even before the intercontinental ballistic missile is on hand to replace it.
Date for the bomber's "early obsolescence": Wilson made good a foolish assurance to Congress that no additional Soldiers were needed for Formosan defense, charges Gavin, by shipping groups over without shoulder patches.
Industrial pressure, he charges, is partly responsible for " hundreds of millions of dollars being spent on obsolete weapons. The Defense Department civil servants who, more permanent in the Pentagon than either politically appointed Secretaries or rotated military career officers, pervert the decision-making machinery.
Though he does not name Defense Comptroller Wilfred J. McNeil, Gavin bombs the fiscal officer in the Pentagon who often rejects projects without understanding of military needs. General James Gavin concluded his closed-door testimony before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee one day last week, Chairman Lyndon Johnson scribbled-out a press statement summarizing the testimony and handed it to Gavin.
Old Soldier Gavin hurriedly looked it over and okayed it. With that, began Round Two of the extraordinary story of Jim Gavin's proffered resignation from the U. In the statement Paratrooper Gavin, the two-fisted boss of the Army's Research and Development section, bluntly revealed his "intuitive" feeling that Army Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor had reneged on an agreement to make him head of the U.
Continental Army Command with a fourth star for his shoulder. Furthermore, said Gavin, the Army had tried to transfer him to command of the U.
Seventh Army in Europe the same three starsa step that was aimed at halting his ringing insistence that the Army's role was being whittled down. To make the mess messier, Army Secretary Wilber Brucker next day called a press conference to explain how it all started.
Before Christmas, when Gavin sent word around that he planned to retire, Brucker called him into his office. He appealed to Gavin to accept the Seventh Army job and a possible promotion a year later.
The two bargained on, as Secretary Brucker told it, with West Pointer Gavin holding out for the Continental Army Command assignment, an anguished Brucker pleading that Gavin should at least stay on in his present job.
At length Gavin promised to "reconsider," for despite his personal ambitions, he still felt strongly for the Army's cause.
It dawned on Lyndon Johnson's subcommittee that Johnson's statements plus Brucker's account of bargaining with one of his generals over a duty assignment had indeed done an injustice to the record of a distinguished Soldier. Back to Capitol Hill next day went Jim Gavin for another run-through before the committee and another press statement.
I have no ax-to-grind.
I am not unhappy with my Secretary. I am not going out to write and raise a rumpus and things. Armyfive-star General Dwight Eisenhower was one of the chief architects of the National Security Act ofwhich set up the separate U.
Air Force and was also designed-though with numerous compromises-to "unify" the armed services. As President of the U. Yet, paradoxically, one of the soft spots of his Administration record is that, during the regime of Defense Secretary Charlie Wilson, Ike let Pentagon administration get out-of-hand.
At his conference with legislative leaders last fortnight the President sat fuming while Congressmen asked sharp questions-and got limp answers from Pentagon officials-about interservice rivalries, overlapping missile programs and the whole organizational foul-up that makes it almost impossible to trace responsibility for any kind of failure in U.
It was not all that simple: And the same organizational tangle that brought on Ike's order is still working against McElroy-or his three subordinate service secretaries, or the 30 assistant and deputy secretaries-achieving the required knowledge and understanding.
Never has that fact been more bluntly put than last week, when the Army's tough, brainy research and development chief, Lieut. Gavin, appeared before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. Neil McElroy, said Paratrooper Gavin pointedly, is "the most able man who has come to that office [Secretary of Defense].
I think really what is needed now is a competent military staff of senior military people working directly for the Secretary of Defense.
I would have them take over the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would have the military staff organized to handle operations, plans, intelligence, and in fact break up the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At no point did Gavin actually advocate a "general staff system"-which conjures up images of Prussianism to many a skittish Congressman-and to all devout Navymen.
But that was precisely what he was urging, just as retired Air Force General James Doolittle had urged a fortnight before when appearing before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.
In the minds of Jim Gavin and Jimmy Doolittle, and in the opinion of others among the nation's best military thinkers, Neil McElroy cannot even begin to solve the Pentagon's problems until he has a general staff, whatever it may be called.
And only within the context of a single, integrated, sensible defense plan can Neil McElroy start using his free hand to tackle the subsidiary problems.
If he is to head off an interservice blow-up that will make past squabbles seem like mere brush fires, McElroy must redefine obsolescent service roles and missions assignments air to the Air Force, sea control to the Navy, land to the Army in the light of missile strategy, to which old geographic concepts no longer apply.AET - Combustion Engine Theory This is a theory course designed to introduce the student to basic heat engine types, their physical configurations and various engine operating cycles.
The gap hypothesis can thus be reformulated question,Why do liberal states accept unwanted immigration?2 * This Patterns and the article was first presented at the conference "Effects of Policy on Migration thanks to of Berlin, November of Immigrants," Humboldt , Learning, knowledge, research, insight: welcome to the world of UBC Library, the second-largest academic research library in Canada.
Beyond Bullets: Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism The critical domestic support requirement is bipartisan consensus on the fundamentals of the strategy, which will take more than a single term to execute and, if successful, should set the direction of .
Why Affirmative Action No Longer Works Though it was a noble idea for compensation in the s, today's America is more divided by class and income difference than by race. David Frum. Cato Institute Policy Analysis No.
NAFTA's Green Accords: Sound and Fury Signifying Little November 17, Jerry Taylor Jerry Taylor is director of natural resource studies at the Cato Institute.